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Arctic sea ice, from bad to worse
Frozen for thousands of years, the Arctic is melting 
faster than ever. Although the sources of Arctic 
warming and pollution primarily originate from 
outside of the region – pointing to the global nature 
of the challenge and the need for multilateral 
solutions – this could change as human activity in the 
region intensifies, driven by the new opportunities of 
a more accessible Arctic.
A renewed EU Arctic Strategy
As the Arctic becomes more strategic than ever, 
the EU also needs to become more strategic in its 
approach to the region. Building on its 2016 Joint 
Communication, it needs a comprehensive strategy 
that more staunchly preserves the fine balance 
between protecting the environment and facilitating 
the sustainable economic and social development of 
the region and its inhabitants.
From cold periphery to a ‘hot spot’ 
of global politics
Potentially lucrative new opportunities in resource 
extraction – namely hydrocarbons and rare earth materials 
– as well as transport and connectivity, are drawing a 
growing number of public and private actors to the region. 
As China seeks to integrate the Arctic’s Northern Sea 
Route into its Belt and Road Initiative in order to access the 
region’s riches, Russia is leading a military build-up aimed 
at asserting control over its resources.
Global solutions for global problems 
Given the global implications of Arctic developments, 
the EU must systematically include the Arctic in 
its thinking when developing sectoral policies and 
engaging with third parties. Ensuring peace and 
stability, as well as environmental preservation and 
sustainable development will require continued 
engagement with the US, Russia and China.
A remote frontier for thousands of years, the Arctic is rapidly gaining international attention. 
Global warming is causing the Central Arctic Ocean’s ice to melt at an unprecedented rate, threatening 
crucial ecosystems and biodiversity in the wider Arctic region. As a result, global sea levels are rising, with 
potentially cataclysmic global social, economic and environmental consequences over the long 
term, irreversible on a timescale relevant to human societies. 
Somewhat paradoxically, these climatic changes are also opening new opportunities for resource extraction 
and transport, resulting in increased economic – and military – activity in the region, both from the 
Arctic Circle countries – most prominently Russia – and new players such as China.
With three EU Member States – Denmark, Finland and Sweden – and some half a million EU citizens 
situated in the Arctic, the EU has a natural and important role to play in the region. And, as the Arctic 
becomes a focal point of economic and geopolitical competition, and is increasingly recognised as being 
central to human and planetary survival, the EU must step up its engagement with Arctic states and 
other stakeholders. Never has ensuring a peaceful and sustainable Arctic been so important.
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The Arctic and mankind: a 
story older than the wheel
The six percent of the Earth’s surface area located north 
of the Arctic Circle (66° 33’N)1 – today encompassing 
the sovereign territories of eight states (Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and 
the United States), and home to over four million 
people, including over 40 different indigenous 
ethnic groups and half a million EU citizens2 – 
have long been the object of much fascination. 
The first European exploration of the Arctic dates 
back to the 10th century, when explorers began seeking 
out shorter maritime commercial routes, namely 
towards Asia. However, these attempts proved 
fruitless until the turn of the 20th century when 
the North-western and North-eastern passages were 
successfully traversed for the first time (Figure 1). 
While the first pioneers failed to pass through the 
Arctic’s frozen waters, they nevertheless began the first 
Arctic explorations, giving way to a wave of scientific 
study of the region’s ecosystem and rich biodiversity, 
with the first scientific observation stations built in the 
region already back in 1882-83.
In subsequent years, rich mineral resources 
discovered in the region – gold, diamonds, copper, 
nickel, coal, and most prominently oil and gas – led 
to a flurry of exploration and economic developments. 
It is only recently, however, that the likely full extent 
of the Arctic’s natural resources was revealed, with a 
2008 geological survey by the United States estimating 
that the region potentially contains some 13% of the 
world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of its natural 
gas (Figure 2)3 – half of which are thought to be under 
Russian control.4  
A jewel under threat
Historically an icy wonderland accessed only by 
the most intrepid explorers, the Arctic has today 
become a major source of international concern. 
Global greenhouse gas emissions are causing the Arctic 
to warm at a much faster rate than the global 
average, compounded by the region’s greater sensitivity 
to global temperature changes – referred to as ‘polar 
amplification’. As a result, Arctic winter temperatures 
are already 2.5°C higher than pre-industrial 
temperatures5 and sea ice and snow in the region 
are melting at an unprecedented rate (Figure 3). 
During the summers of 2007 and 2012 as much as 
40% of the Central Arctic Ocean already consisted of 
open water.6
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Figure 1: Shorter sea routes act as a 
major driver of Arctic interest  
Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route compared to current routes
Source: GRID-Arendal
Figure 2: The Arctic is thought to host 
some of the world’s largest undiscovered 
mineral and fossil fuel resources
Sources: European Environment Agency, Nordregio
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Despite its remoteness, the region is particularly 
sensitive to atmospheric pollutants, in particular black 
carbon – the sooty black material emitted from coal-
fired power plants, gas and diesel engines, and other 
sources that burn fossil fuel – which deposit on sea 
ice, turning it black so that it starts to absorb solar 
radiation – rather than reflect it. Not only does this 
accelerate melting, it contributes to a vicious cycle 
whereby the Earth’s white, reflective ice surface shrinks 
in favour of darker surface areas made up of ocean 
and bare rock, which absorb more heat, thereby further 
precipitating global warming and Arctic ice melting. In 
turn, thawing permafrost has the potential to release 
billions of tonnes of CO2 equivalents more than 
humanity has hitherto emitted, thus transforming 
the Arctic into a major source of heat.7 
Current estimates consider some 70% of inhabited 
or built permafrost areas to be prone to thawing, 
with the risk of infrastructure, homes, and other 
buildings collapsing, forcing local communities to 
relocate. In Alaska, for instance, an estimated 16% to 
24% of total permafrost will degrade by the end of the 
century.8 
This is already having grave repercussions on Arctic 
biodiversity, populations and ecosystems, but 
also on the world as a whole. Lakes and ponds are 
disappearing. Dangerous levels of organic pollutants 
and heavy metals are entering the food chain, putting 
animal and human health at risk.9 Melting sea ice 
threatens the survival of many species such as 
polar bears and walruses. Acidification is affecting 
entire oceans and underwater ecosystems, with the 
international scientific community anticipating mass 
extinctions.10 Global sea levels are expected to rise 
by 74 cm by the end of the century,11 with major 
repercussions on coastal areas the world round, while 
rising global temperatures are causing more frequent 
extreme weather events around the globe – droughts, 
rainstorms and floods.12
Recent studies also show an unprecedented number 
of microplastics frozen in Arctic sea ice,13 with further 
concerns that a sixth ‘garbage patch’, i.e. a 
concentration of marine debris, could be forming 
in the Arctic waters.14 The Arctic ice not only acts as a 
store for ocean debris that could potentially be released 
as global temperatures get warmer, but the movement 
of sea ice could also deposit microplastics in areas that 
were previously plastic-free.
Although there are still relatively few sources of 
plastic, carbon dioxide, black carbon and other 
pollutant emissions within the Arctic region itself, 
that could change as human activity in the region 
increases rapidly, driven by the new opportunities of a 
more accessible Arctic.15 
And yet, the fact that most of the sources of Arctic 
warming and pollution originate from outside of the 
Arctic region, while the consequences extend well 
beyond it – taking on a planetary dimension – highlight 
the global nature of the challenges faced in the 
Arctic region – and thus the need for global 
solutions. 
Melting ice opens vast new economic 
opportunities 
As the Arctic sea ice melts, its vast natural and 
mineral resources become more accessible, at 
a time when global resources are coming under 
increasing pressure.
Of particular interest are the region’s potentially 
vast reserves of rare earth elements – central to 
the ongoing global digital and low-carbon economic 
transition.16 Currently, 90% of global rare earth 
production stems from China, which claims its reserves 
could run out in the next twenty years due to over-
extraction.17 On the one side, by gaining control of the 
Arctic’s reserves, China could maintain its domination 
over these precious materials. On the other, those 
countries that are currently heavily reliant on Chinese 
imports are eager to gain access to an alternative 
source of supply, in particular as the US-China trade war 
heats up and China threatens to impose restrictions on 
rare earth material exports.18 
Locals are eager to make the most of new opportunities 
– whether in terms of fishing, agriculture, or exploitation 
of mineral and fossil fuel resources. But they are not 
alone. Although considerable uncertainty remains 
over whether much of the Arctic’s oil, gas and mineral 
resources are extractable at all19 – be it for economic, 
social, political, logistical or technological reasons – 
investments are being poured into exploration and 
extraction across the region. 
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Figure 3: Arctic sea ice is melting at an 
unprecedented speed
Source: US National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC)
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For instance, Gazprom already extracts hydrocarbons 
from the Russian Prirazlomnoye field on the Arctic 
shelf,20 while a rare-earth elements mine project on the 
Kvanefjeld site in Greenland is awaiting final decision 
by the environmental authorities of the government of 
Greenland.21
In parallel, as previously permanently frozen 
areas give way to open water, comes the promise 
of a new logistical hub of global significance, with 
new possibilities for shipping between Asia, Europe and 
North America, either through the Northwest Passage – 
shorter than the Panama route – and, most prominently, 
through the Northern Sea Route, which is shorter than 
the Suez route by several days, making it less energy-
intensive and cheaper to navigate.22 
Although some estimate the Northern Sea Route may 
become navigable year-round without the use of 
icebreaker escort by the 2040s or 2050s,23 there are 
many obstacles to be addressed. 
First, significant investments in harbour facilities 
are needed along the entire Russian coast of the 
route. Second, the remaining sea ice and occasional 
shallow waters prevent ships from travelling full speed, 
thus reducing expected time-gains. Third, the ice-
resistant ships required to travel along the route are 
more expensive, also reducing the expected financial 
savings. Fourth, the risk of accidents is higher than 
along the traditional routes, due to the weather and the 
scarcer search and rescue capabilities – likely requiring 
additional training and insurance. The dependence 
on Russian governance over the route, as well as 
its icebreaker services may also act as a deterrent, 
although other countries, including several EU Member 
States, also have substantial icebreaker capacities,24 
while Finland is a leading supplier, with 60% of the 
global icebreaker fleet designed and built in the 
country.25 
As a result of these barriers, the average number of 
ships using this passage for transit remains under 
20 a year,26 compared to over 17,000 ships using the 
Suez Canal route.27 Nonetheless, transported cargo 
volumes are increasing rapidly, with some 20.2 
million tonnes of freight passing through the Northern 
Sea Route in 2018 – twice as much as the previous year 
(Figure 5).28 The vast majority of freight volumes consist 
of hydrocarbon exports (crude oil and liquefied natural 
gas) from the Arctic coast of Russia, with Russian 
President Vladimir Putin setting a target for shipments 
to grow to 80 million tonnes by 2024. 
Shorter transport routes are not the only advantage 
being reaped by investors. As the Arctic ice melts, it 
creates new passageways under the oceans, creating 
shorter paths for underwater cable connections, such 
as the Arctic Connect data cable that will link Europe 
and Asia, thereby accelerating the speed at which digital 
data can be carried from one continent to another. 
Projected investments could turn the region into an 
international traffic node for data communication, 
contributing to the socio-economic development of 
Arctic areas, while also generating significant global 
economic benefits – e.g. for telecommunications 
providers and financial markets that rely on speedy 
connections.29
New actors and new interests
As new economic opportunities abound, the race 
for control intensifies in a region that is already 
home to overlapping claims on the territory’s resources 
(Figure 6), and where new actors from outside the 
region – including a fast-growing and ever-more 
assertive China – are taking a keen interest.
The Arctic has already long proven to be a key 
strategic location – connecting some of the 
world’s superpowers from North America to 
Europe and the Soviet Union, all the way to 
Figure 4: The number of licenses issued 
for mineral mining in Greenland increased 
fivefold since 2002
Source: Government of Greenland, 2019
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Figure 5: The Arctic Northern Sea Route 
is getting busy as cargo carriers seek 
shorter transit times
Annual freight traffic on the Northern Sea Route in million tonnes
Source: Atomflot, 2019
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China. In fact, it played a key role during World War 
II, providing a route for transporting supplies and 
weaponry,30 as well as in the subsequent Cold War, 
when the region not only provided the shortest route 
for US and Soviet strategic nuclear bombers and 
missiles, but also training waters for nuclear submarines 
that would become the foundations of continuous-
at-sea deterrence.31 Today, the region links Russia’s 
oil and gas to China’s growing economy, China’s 
exports to the Single European Market, and 
Russia’s Northern Fleet to warmer seas.32
To date, the Arctic region has remained a haven 
of peace, largely thanks to the governance 
framework put in place in the 1980s and 1990s 
that has helped it to remain largely – but not entirely – 
isolated from otherwise sometimes strained relations 
between certain Arctic countries.33
    International Arctic Governance
International Arctic governance was minimal during the Cold War, as the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that defines and regulates, inter alia, territorial waters and Exclusive Economic 
Zones (EEZs), entered in force only in 1994.34 UNCLOS contains provisions to adjudicate on competing claims over 
extended continental shelves,35 even if Arctic countries can negotiate and conclude international treaties 
delimitating their respective waters and continental shelves themselves – as have done Russia and 
Norway bilaterally in 2010.36
In 1989, as the Cold War was coming to an end, Finland launched what became known as the ‘Rovaniemi’ 
process – largely considered as the origin of current intergovernmental Arctic cooperation. The move came in the 
midst of an international rapprochement with Russia, but also amid rising concern for environmental protection 
in the Arctic regions. The process has since led to the creation of several regional structures focusing on the 
Arctic. Most prominently, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council was created in 1993 with the EU as a founding 
member, focusing on the sustainable development of the Barents region. 
The Arctic Council followed in 1996 – an intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation, coordination and 
interaction among the Arctic States, Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic 
issues, in particular on issues of sustainable development and environmental protection. While strictly speaking, 
membership of the organisation is limited to the eight countries located within the Arctic Circle,37 many non-Arctic 
states as well as non-governmental and international organisations hold the status of observer in the Arctic 
Council. These notably include seven EU Member States,38 Switzerland, China, Japan, India, the Red Cross, the 
Saami Council, the UN Development Programme and others. However, despite being a crucial source of expertise, 
funding and information for the Arctic Council’s work, the EU itself does not hold a formal observer status, 
largely due to initial Canadian resistance over seal trade and to subsequent Russian obstruction since 2014.39 
Nevertheless, the EU does participate to the Arctic Council’s work as a de facto observer, upon invitation.
To date, the Arctic Council has produced tangible results, among which three agreements legally binding 
the Arctic member states on issues ranging from search and rescue cooperation (2011), to marine oil pollution 
preparedness and response (2013), and scientific cooperation (2017).
Several sectoral initiatives also contribute to the international governance of the Arctic. Most prominently, the 
2015 Paris climate agreement40 aims to ensure that global temperatures do not rise by over 2°C.41 In addition, 
the global Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC) to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants has been working 
on the Black Carbon problem since 2012, with a secretariat hosted by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP). 
Figure 6: Territorial claims in the Arctic 
Note: This map does not account for the May 2019 Canadian Arctic 
continental shelf submission with the UN Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf. 
Sources: Centre for Borders Research (IBRU) - Durham University, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark
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However, the growing diversity of actors 
and interests in the region could put existing 
frameworks to the test. 
Within the Arctic Council itself, there is a growing 
divide between, on the one hand, the proponents of 
prioritising environmental sustainability and 
multilateral solutions, and, on the other, those 
placing economic development and national 
sovereignty concerns above all else. 
While the first group are perhaps more numerous – 
encompassing the European Arctic states and Canada, 
the latter group includes the two global heavyweights 
– the US and Russia. What is more, even among those 
listing environmental protection and the peaceful 
and sustainable exploitation of natural resources 
as key concerns, not all do so with the same 
degree of assiduity – be it in words or in deeds.
Beyond the Arctic Council, a growing number of other 
non-Arctic states – China in particular – are taking a 
keen interest in developments in the Arctic, questioning 
the exclusiveness of regional cooperation settings. 
Euro-Arctic and Canada pledge 
sustainability first
Sweden has been pushing hard for robust 
regulatory frameworks focusing on environmental 
sustainability and respecting international norms 
and United Nations Conventions.42 Finland also places 
the sustainable development of the region as a 
priority, while also highlighting the importance of digital 
and physical connectivity, and of good-neighbourly 
relations with other Arctic states, notably Russia.43 
Similarly, the Kingdom of Denmark44 underscores 
peace and security, sustainable development, 
protection of the environment, climate and 
biodiversity, and international cooperation,45 
as do Canada, Norway46 and Iceland – with both 
Oslo and Reykjavik also stressing the need to take 
economic advantage of their natural resources 
(energy, minerals, fish, and others) and of potential new 
shipping possibilities.47 Norway and Sweden are also 
rapidly developing their national and cross-border 
infrastructure in the High North, including airports, 
roads, railroads and harbours. Canada aims to maintain 
its sovereign rights and deter any encroachments on it, 
but without provoking other actors, and to manage the 
growing interest from non-Arctic countries.
All five of these countries also emphasise the rights 
of indigenous peoples – associated with the issue of 
social harmony in Canada. 
Russia pursues national sovereignty 
and economic growth, backed up by 
military clout
By contrast, Russia’s official policy regarding its 
Arctic resources is oriented towards expanding 
Russia’s resource base to satisfy its energy 
needs and socio-economic development.48 It has 
significantly stepped up its Arctic activities in the 
fields of natural resources, transport, and defence 
and its stated objective is for offshore Arctic oil to 
account for 20-30% of Russian production by 2050,49 
to compensate for the progressive depletion of its 
other reserves.50 Indeed, as much as two thirds of 
Russia’s oil and gas are thought to be in Russia’s 
Arctic Exclusive Economic Zone.51 However, getting its 
hands on these reserves is not so easy. Unilateral 
exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons 
in the Arctic is expensive and complex due to 
technological and logistical reasons, and therefore 
increasingly requires international cooperation.52 This 
goes a long way to explaining Russian’s willingness 
to sustain an environment that is conducive to 
effective international cooperation and foreign 
investment in the Arctic – as well as its expanding 
Arctic collaboration with a cash-rich and energy-hungry 
China. 
Indeed, while Russia’s state-controlled oil and gas 
companies, Rosneft and Gazprom, have sought 
cooperation with American and European counterparts 
(e.g. BP and Rosneft formalised two joint ventures to 
assess prospects of extraction in the Russian Arctic, 
in 2016 and 201753), Russia’s illegal annexation of 
Crimean Peninsula in 2014, its deliberate destabilisation 
of Ukraine and the consequent Western sanctions 
imposed on Russia have complicated cooperation 
with Western companies. ExxonMobil, for instance, 
failed to obtain permission from the US Treasury to 
drill jointly with Rosneft in the Russian Arctic.54 More 
broadly, the sanctions deny Moscow access to the 
technology and capital necessary to exploit its Arctic 
resources.55 
In addition to its exploration and exploitation activities, 
Russia views the Northern Sea Route as a source 
of national and regional development, officially 
designating it as an international maritime navigation 
route subject to Russia’s jurisdiction.56 As a result it is 
keen to ensure the logistical investments needed 
along the route – improving infrastructure, such as 
ports, lines of communications, search and rescue 
stations and effective border control services. But it is 
also eager to remain fully in control of the route.
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This explains why Moscow is creating regulatory 
and administrative barriers to foreign navigation 
along the route – in addition to pre-existing obstacles – 
namely with rules on pollution, tariffs, proof of liability 
and insurance. Foreign ships are even required by law57 
to pay for weather and ice reports, for Russian pilots 
and for Russian icebreaking services – which explains 
why re-building its nuclear-powered icebreaker 
fleet58 – while they are forbidden from transporting oil 
or gas extracted in Russia along the route.59
In a bid to protect its interests, the Russian Ministry 
of Defence recently announced restrictions on foreign 
warships passing through the Arctic Ocean.60 It is also 
engaging in a large-scale military build-up in the 
Arctic, across the different branches of Russia’s armed 
forces, explicitly designed to protect its resources and 
the Northern Sea Route (Figure 7).61 Among others, 
strategic bomber and Northern fleet patrols resumed for 
the first time since the end of the Cold War already in 
2007, and the Northern Fleet has been significantly 
upgraded since, becoming the largest of Russia’s four 
fleets. Moscow has also expanded naval patrols near its 
neighbours and increased its submarines’ operational 
radius.62 Large investments have been made in Russia’s 
missile defence systems, and the Russian Ministry of 
Defence has announced over 100 military facilities 
in the region. Six new military bases have been 
established since 2015.63 
As a result of this build-up, some commentators 
have proclaimed a ‘new Cold War’, or suggested 
that Russia is preparing to conquer the Arctic.64 Yet 
these fears seem largely exaggerated. First, Russia’s 
military build-up must be seen in a wider context 
of military restructuring and appears to be largely 
defensive rather than offensive, aimed primarily 
at defending Russia’s borders and national interests in 
the Arctic.65 Second, as most of Russia’s Arctic oil and 
gas is within its uncontested Exclusive Economic Zone,66 
and as existing international law favours countries 
with a coastline on the Arctic Ocean,67 Russia’s self-
interest is to uphold existing international law 
and UNCLOS particularly.68 Moscow has therefore 
committed to do so and to keep the Arctic a region 
of peaceful cooperation, 69 agreed with the US on six 
new and safer two-way maritime routes in the Bering 
strait,70 and co-led the discussions leading to the 2017 
Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific 
Cooperation.71  
All in all, Russia’s strategy in the Arctic appears 
to be multifaceted, comprising elements of 
geopolitical competition as well as practical 
cooperation. While undoubtedly, Russia’s engagement 
in the region is partly driven by a desire to achieve 
great power status and, as the only non-NATO Arctic 
coastal state, to defend its territory against potential 
attacks, it is also defined by economic interests dictating 
international cooperation and legal stability.72 
United States slowly waking up  
The previous US administration under President 
Barack Obama viewed the Arctic primarily as an 
illustration of the need to tackle global warming 
more forcefully. It thus created new positions, such as a 
Special Representative to the Arctic, and new protected 
lands and waters in the American Arctic to protect the 
environment from potential negative developments.73 
The current US administration, however, has been 
retreating from international environmental 
governance as well as from the US’ domestic 
environment protection agenda set up by the previous 
administration. However, the Arctic is increasingly 
becoming a priority for the US, in particular in light of 
the growing rapprochement between Russia and China. 
A recent US Department of Defense Arctic Strategy 
highlights that the region’s security environment is 
becoming more complex and is entering an ‘era of 
strategic competition’.74 And, while the US appears to 
remain committed to multilateral governance in 
the Arctic, a new geopolitical struggle could emerge, 
as demonstrated by US Secretary of State Michael 
Pompeo’s speech in May 2019, in which he singled out 
China’s expanding capabilities and ambitions in the 
region and highlighted the risk of Beijing transforming 
the region into ‘a new South China Sea’.75 
Infantry base
Headquarters
Naval base
Electronic 
warfare & radar
Airﬁeld & search 
and rescue
Air defense
Figure 7: Russia’s military build-up in the 
Arctic
Source: Foreign Policy
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China’s ‘near-Arctic’ state strategy
A self-styled ‘near-Arctic state’ with the ambition 
of becoming a ‘Polar power’,76 China released its 
first ever White Paper on Arctic Policy in January 
2018.77 It starts with the premise that ‘the Arctic is a 
global issue that cannot be left to Arctic states alone’,78 
all the while recognising Arctic states’ sovereignty and 
rights, but arguing that international cooperation is 
required for mutually beneficial outcomes. 
Due to its large reliance on energy imports and 
fears of overdependence on the Malacca straights or on 
waters dominated by the US navy,80 China considers 
the Northern Sea Route to be of strategic 
importance. This is why it is seeking to create a ‘Polar 
Silk Road’ as part of its Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI).79 
Chinese shipping company COSCO has already expressed 
its interest in starting summer traffic along the 
route,81 and Chinese investors have expressed 
theirs in funding the Rovaniemi – Kirkenes railway 
and the Helsinki – Tallinn railway tunnel projects, 
which would connect the European Arctic to the Single 
Market.82 The completion of this railway would result in 
the Arctic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea being linked 
by rail, effectively closing the circle of China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative.83 China also launched its 
first domestically built icebreaker in 2018, and has 
opened a bid to build a nuclear-powered icebreaker, which 
contains the requirement for foreign companies involved 
to transfer technology to their Chinese partners.84
China’s interests extend well beyond the Northern Sea 
Route: China is involved in resource extraction 
activities in Greenland, including for rare earth 
minerals,85 while it has provided financial backing for 
hydrocarbon extraction projects, in particular in the 
Russian Arctic, such as the Yamal liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) project in Siberia.
At the same time, Beijing is conscious of the importance 
of environmental protection.86 In 2017, it published 
non-binding guidelines for a ‘green Belt and Road’87 
in an attempt to balance environmental protection 
and sustainable development. They state that China 
will aim to preserve the health of oceans, maritime 
ecosystems and biodiversity, and to strengthen 
international cooperation against climate change.88 
To date, China has succeeded in positioning itself as a 
proponent of Arctic development, rather than as a rival 
to the Arctic states, earning it observer status in the 
Arctic Council as of 2013. As a result, it recognises 
existing international law applicable to the region, notably 
UNCLOS. In return, it expects its own rights, such as 
freedom of navigation, to be respected by Arctic states.89
A growing, albeit complex Sino-
Russian cooperation 
China and Russia are increasingly looking for 
ways to cooperate in the Arctic, leading discussions 
since 2015 on potential collaboration between the 
Eurasian Economic Union, the Moscow-dominated 
regional association, and China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative. The 2017 ‘China–Russia Joint Statement 
on Further Strengthening Comprehensive, Strategic 
and Cooperative Partnership’ specifically mentions 
cooperation in the Arctic in the fields of transport, 
scientific research, energy resources, tourism and 
environmental protection.90 
Western-imposed sanctions have also forced Russia 
to look East, and notably to China, to support 
investments both along the Northern Sea Route 
and for the extraction of hydrocarbons.91 For 
instance, when Western companies withdrew their 
funding for the Yamal LNG project, the Chinese National 
Petroleum Company and the China Development Bank 
stepped in.92 Indeed, Beijing has shown itself very keen 
to assist, viewing the insufficient infrastructure 
along the Northern Sea Route as an economic 
opportunity rather than an obstacle.93 
Notwithstanding this, Russia remains somewhat 
cautious in its interactions with China, as it wants 
to maintain control over the Northern Sea Route, and 
is not too keen on China developing its own icebreaker 
fleet. This goes in contradiction with China’s 
interests in maintaining freedom of navigation, 
and it is unclear how Beijing may react to Russian 
administrative and regulatory barriers to foreign 
navigation on the medium- to long-term.94 
Rising interest among other non-
Arctic countries
Within Europe, several non-Arctic EU Member States 
have long taken a keen – primarily scientific – 
interest in the Arctic, significantly contributing 
to international polar research, and being granted 
observer status at the Arctic Council. These include 
Poland, which has had a manned research station in 
Svalbard since 1958.95 The Netherlands, too, conducts 
scientific research from its Svalbard polar station, 
with a view to mitigating climate change, and to 
contributing to the sustainability and preservation 
of the Arctic.96 Similar considerations motivate the 
research activities of other EU Member States, such 
as Spain,97 Italy,98 and prominently the United 
Kingdom, the Arctic’s ‘nearest neighbour’,99 which 
ranked fourth among non-Arctic states in the amount 
of scientific publications on the Arctic.100 Along with 
the UK, Germany, France and Spain also recognise 
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the economic possibilities and environmental 
challenges of the region, and the potential for 
geopolitical competition. Accordingly, Paris and Berlin 
call for greater international cooperation and for 
the enforcement of the highest environmental 
standards when exploiting the region’s resources.101 As 
for Switzerland, which has observer status in the Arctic 
Council since 2017, its primary interest also relates to 
climate research.
Outside of Europe, the two other Arctic Council 
observer countries are Japan and India.
Although it still foresees that most ships will continue 
using the Suez route under current circumstances, 
Japan is preparing for the eventuality of the 
Northern Sea Route gaining in prominence.102 As 
a result, it is paying particular attention to Russia’s 
military build-up in areas surrounding its territory – all 
the while investing in Russian Arctic liquefied natural 
gas.103 On its side, South Korea is dissatisfied with 
Russia’s practice of charging a fee for traversing the 
international waters composing the Northern Sea 
Route, while Singapore, as a small island nation has 
environmental concerns regarding projected sea level 
rise, and the Northern Sea Route may jeopardise its 
status as a global maritime transportation hub.104 
Accordingly, both Japan and Singapore cooperate 
closely with other Arctic countries, notably the US. 
Finally, while its broader strategic interests remain 
unclear, India is wary of competition from China 
and engages with the region, having concluded a 
twenty-year agreement on liquefied natural gas 
supply with Gazprom,105 and being involved in 
scientific research in Svalbard (Norway).106 
What is clear is that all these countries are eager 
to see the Arctic Council engage more with non-
Arctic countries and consider their interests more 
strongly. Indeed, the benefits that Arctic coastal states 
derive from existing international law, notably UNCLOS, 
are seen by countries, such as India among others,107 
as being disproportionate and at the expense of states 
without an Arctic coastline. Accordingly, India and others 
would prefer the Arctic governed collectively at 
the international level rather than becoming a terrain 
for geopolitical competition.
The EU in the Arctic: a responsible 
actor with intricate ties
The EU’s engagement with the Arctic is decades 
old and dates back to Denmark’s accession in 1973 – at 
which time Greenland also joined. However, following 
a referendum held in 1982, the Arctic island withdrew 
from the EU and is now associated to the EU under the 
Overseas Association Decision. The Arctic came back on 
the EU agenda in 1995, when two more Arctic states – 
Finland and Sweden – joined the EU. At that time, the 
EU played a pivotal role in the process leading to 
the establishment of the Northern Dimension (ND) 
as a regional forum in 1999. The Northern Dimension 
provides a framework for dialogue, cooperation, and 
outreach to non-governmental stakeholders,108 and 
is organised around four partnerships,109 notably the 
Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership 
(NDEP).110 Launched as an EU policy in 1999, it became 
a joint policy with Iceland, Norway and Russia in 2006. 
Although the EU acknowledges that the primary 
responsibility for Arctic policy rests with the 
Arctic states themselves, the fact that three of 
these are also EU Member States means that the 
Arctic is de facto an object of EU internal policy.
However, the EU’s legal competence vary depending 
on the specific policy area.111 For instance, while it has 
exclusive legal competence regarding the conservation 
of marine biological resources under the common 
fisheries policy, it may only support, coordinate, or 
complement national industrial or tourism policies.112 
Therefore, the EU acts mostly ‘as an external actor’ 
in the Arctic.113 And yet, the growing interest and 
involvement of non-Arctic EU Member States in the 
region – some of which participate as observers in 
the Arctic Council – points to the need for greater 
coordination at EU level in order to make the most of 
possible synergies.
Despite having so far been denied observer status 
in the Arctic Council, the EU has thus continued to 
develop its policies towards the Arctic, in a series of 
Communications, the first one dating from 2008, and 
setting three main policy objectives: protecting and 
preserving the Arctic in unison with its population, 
promoting the sustainable use of resources, 
and contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral 
governance.114 A later 2012 Joint Communication 
on Developing a European Union Policy towards the 
Arctic Region built on these objectives and proposed 
increased EU support for research to address climate 
change, responsible EU action to ensure that economic 
development of the region is sustainable, and 
intensified EU engagement with other states, entities, 
and indigenous peoples.115 
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The latest EU document specifically addressing the 
Arctic region is the 2016 Joint Communication on ‘An 
integrated EU policy for the Arctic’. Building on its 
predecessors, it confirms the three priorities of the EU 
regarding the Arctic, while stressing the importance of 
research, science and innovation across all of them 
(Figure 8):116
1. Climate change and safeguarding the 
environment, with a focus on research, climate 
mitigation and adaptation strategies, and protecting 
the environment;
2. Sustainable development in and around the 
region, with a focus on sustainable innovation, 
investment, space technology and maritime safety. 
3. International cooperation, revolving around 
international organisations and fora, bilateral 
cooperation, engagement with indigenous peoples, 
fisheries governance and scientific cooperation
In parallel, the 2016 EU’s Global Strategy reaffirms 
the EU’s strategic interest in the Arctic ‘remaining 
a low-tension area, with ongoing cooperation 
ensured by the Arctic Council, a well-functioning legal 
framework, and solid political and security cooperation.’ 
In this endeavour, the Global Strategy goes on, the 
EU will work on climate action, environmental 
research, sustainable development, all the while 
cooperating with Arctic states, institutions, 
indigenous peoples and local communities.117
To help it achieve these objectives, the EU has 
appointed, since September 2017, an ‘EU Ambassador 
at Large for the Arctic’ to raise awareness of, and 
discuss, Arctic issues with the wider public and with the 
EU’s partners.118
Figure 8: The EU’s Arctic Strategy as defined in the 2016 Joint Communication on an 
integrated European Union policy for the Arctic
Source: European Political Strategy Centre
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Keeping pace with the 
Arctic: Implications for the 
EU’s Arctic Strategy
Just as the Arctic is changing rapidly, so are the 
strategies of Arctic players – big and small. This 
is also happening within the EU. For instance, the UK 
updated its Arctic Policy Framework in April 2018,119 
while Poland’s Arctic strategy is expected this year, 
and the Netherlands and Sweden are in the process of 
updating and/or publishing theirs. 
The new Finnish government inaugurated in June 2019 
has also committed to renewing the Finnish Arctic 
Strategy.120  In this context, as a recognised by many 
Member States,121 the EU is uniquely well-placed to 
help coordinate and complement Member States’ 
Arctic policies, as it has done for twenty years already. 
With this in mind, the 2016 Joint Communication 
is undoubtedly a useful blueprint, striking a 
delicate but necessary balance between environmental 
protection and sustainable development of the 
region, and recognising the centrality of multilateral 
cooperation in achieving this balance. 
Yet, as the Arctic region grows in geopolitical 
and geo-economic significance, the EU also needs 
to reflect on its key strategic interests there, and 
update its approach to take into account the new 
developments in the region – such as the acceleration 
of climate change, as well as the predominance of 
Chinese plans and investments in Arctic logistics and 
infrastructure projects. Indeed, the new opportunities 
and rising interest in the Arctic from inter alia China 
and Russia can only mean one thing: coordination 
of European Arctic policies is needed now more 
than ever. Even if the Arctic remains primarily the 
responsibility of the Arctic States, only through broader 
cooperation among all Member States – as well as 
other actors in the region, be they local or global – can the 
EU address the challenges and opportunities of the region.
Clarity on its engagement
One of the criticisms to date regarding the EU’s 
engagement in the Arctic is that it has been more about 
gaining a seat at the table than about implementing 
a clear Arctic strategy that puts the sustainable 
development of the region as a central focus. 
While this criticism seems unfair in light of the – widely 
recognised valuable – work that the EU does in the 
Arctic Council Working Groups, there is clearly scope 
for the EU to define its positioning vis-à-vis the 
Arctic in a more strategic, visible and integrated 
manner – as done by the Chinese.
This could be achieved through the development and 
implementation of a new ‘Arctic Strategy’, based 
on the experience and lessons drawn from the 2016 
Joint Communication, with a timeframe aligned with 
other relevant EU policies, such as the 2030 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). Such a strategy must be 
elaborated in close consultation and cooperation 
with all Member States and competent EU 
institutions and services to have the desired impact 
and to include all Arctic-relevant policies. In addition, the 
EU should mainstream its Arctic objectives into 
all areas of EU action – from transport and energy, to 
agriculture, fisheries, investment, research and innovation, 
environmental, and other policies.
While the new strategy should continue to promote a 
balance between sustainable economic development 
and protecting the environment, it must be more 
precise in how this can be achieved and push for clearer 
‘rules of the game’. Currently, even though most 
Arctic actors claim to place environmental protection 
and sustainability at the top of their agenda, they also 
vocally or tacitly endorse the exploitation of the Arctic’s 
energy and other natural resources for their own energy 
security and economic development. Indeed, this is to be 
expected given that the Arctic’s resources are likely to be 
crucial for the global and European economy in the near 
future. In 2016, the EU imported 86.7% of the petroleum 
it consumed, and 44.4% of these imports originated either 
from Russia or Norway. The respective figures for gas are 
even higher: 70.4% and 64.7%, and growing each year.122 
The EU therefore has as much as an interest as China or 
Russia in expanding extraction activities in the region. 
Yet, reflecting the Arctic’s unique characteristics 
and value, a specific Arctic environmental impact 
assessment could be warranted. Such an initiative 
already has the European Parliament’s support,123 and 
could be carried out by the European Environmental 
Agency. Indeed, as a growing number of public and 
private actors compete to reap the benefits of the Arctic’s 
resources and its growth potential, the EU has a key role 
to play in developing and promoting the necessary 
international frameworks – regulatory or not – for 
a much more sustainable and environmentally 
friendly approach to economic activities in the area.
Finally, the EU should more actively promote the 
participation of local communities, including 
indigenous peoples, in decision-making on matters 
that concern them. This could be done by increasing 
availability of information, and by developing specific 
outreach initiatives to ensure that relevant expertise 
is reflected in EU policies towards the region. The 
EU should also consider opening programme offices/
contact points in Greenland and the Faroe islands 
to provide additional platforms for dialogue and to raise 
awareness of the EU’s prospective programmes.
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Giving the Arctic the prominence it 
deserves in the EU’s institutional set-
up and funding programmes
The EU’s Arctic strategy needs to be reflected across the 
EU’s institutional set-up, and within its programmes, 
projects, finances and relevant legislation. 
In the European Commission, there needs to be a more 
strategic and comprehensive approach to the Global 
Commons in general and the Arctic in particular. The 
increasing competition over common properties – be it 
cyber, space, high seas or atmosphere – calls for an over-
arching, cross-cutting strategy. The Arctic is central to such 
an effort, not the least because of its close proximity and 
central importance to European security and economic 
interests. Given the multitude of issues to be dealt 
with, it is unlikely that a single Commissioner could 
cover the breath of policies pertaining to the Arctic. 
However, entrusting a coordinating function for Arctic 
policies to one (or more) Vice-President(s) could yield 
real dividends in terms of ‘connecting the dots’ and better 
anticipating the future trajectory of this important region.
This would also serve to facilitate cooperation between 
the European Commission and the European 
External Action Service, which should maintain 
its successful Arctic ambassador scheme – and 
strengthen this position with adequate resources. The 
Council of the EU should have a specific working 
party covering Northern Europe and the Arctic 
in a comprehensive manner as suggested already in 
2016 joint communication. This portfolio is currently 
assigned to the Working Party on Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia (COEST). If a new working party cannot be 
created, the Arctic matters should be given a higher 
profile in COEST to reflect its growing importance, 
and cover environmental protection and sustainable 
development in the region. There should also be regular 
updates regarding Arctic developments at the 
Political and Security Committee and during 
Council meetings. Furthermore, the role of the 
European Parliament should be strengthened in 
the EU’s Arctic policy formulation. This could take the 
form of regular debates on Arctic Policy in the 
plenary, through activities of a specifically designated 
Interparliamentary Delegation, which would have 
a special responsibility for the Arctic cooperation. A 
rapporteur for Arctic matters could also be elected 
within the European Parliament for the duration of the 
preparation of the next Joint Communication.
The European Structural and Investment Funds 
(ESIF) and the InvestEU Programme (currently the 
European Fund for Strategic Investment), which could be 
complemented with an Arctic Investment Platform, 
should remain an important part of the financial tools 
that the EU can leverage to develop the Arctic region for 
the duration of the 2021-27 Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF). Future investments should adequately 
reflect the growing importance of transport, logistics 
and telecommunications infrastructure in a region that 
remains largely remote to date. This includes the planning 
of the Trans-European Transport Network as well as 
investments in ICT and infrastructure to connect the EU’s 
Arctic regions to European and global digital networks, 
in line with the Commission’s strategy on Connectivity 
for a European Gigabit Society.124 Space policy must 
not be forgotten either, nor the infrastructure for space 
research already present in the EU’s Arctic regions. The 
EU should also look at the possibilities for playing a key 
part in facilitating digital solutions suited to the Arctic 
environment by, for example, expanding existing satellite 
programmes to cover the Arctic region’s specific needs.
The planned future Neighbourhood, Development 
and International Cooperation Instrument 
(NDICI) will also be an important tool in the next 
financial framework, as will the future Decision 
on the Overseas Association – that now includes 
Greenland – and which highlights the clear Arctic 
dimension of EU cooperation in the region. Indeed, 
one could imagine funding activities to tackle climate 
change and other challenges in the Arctic. Likewise, 
Arctic research funding should be coherently increased 
in the coming Horizon Europe programme. 
Engaging selectively with global partners 
to ensure mutual interest are met
The Northern Dimension policy and partnerships should 
be considered a platform of political dialogue and a 
toolkit of practical cooperation in the Euro-Arctic region. 
As a part of the EU’s policies towards Russia, the EU 
should continue its selective engagement with 
Russia in areas of common interest. In the Arctic, 
these might include peace and stability, environmental 
protection, education and research, health, culture, 
transport, management of shared fish stocks, search and 
rescue capabilities, and nuclear safety. The EU should 
also take a pro-active role in the Black Carbon 
question by making full use of existing mechanisms and 
by providing instruments for cross-border cooperation 
between Russia and the EU. The EU should also explore 
constructive approaches to questions related to military 
security in the Arctic by encouraging coast guard 
cooperation and cooperation in maritime safety.
The EU should also initiate a dialogue with 
China and other Asian states to address common 
interests such as peaceful cooperation, climate 
change and connectivity, as it has in the EU-China 
Blue Partnership for the Oceans.125 At the same 
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time and notwithstanding possibilities for pragmatic 
cooperation on these issues, the EU should 
exercise caution in its engagement, as China’s 
long-term aspirations remain unknown.
Similarly, the EU should intensify its dialogue with 
the US to address our common interests in the Arctic. 
The EU and the US should be able to find common 
interests in environmental preservation and sustainable 
economic activities in the Arctic. 
More broadly, the EU should mainstream its Arctic 
objectives into all areas of external action and 
systematically take into account the Arctic in its external 
relations with Arctic and non-Arctic states, as well as in 
international negotiations where applicable.
It must also continue to promote the Arctic Council as 
an inclusive, consensus-based international forum, 
and to become a formal Arctic Council observer. In addition, 
it should also support the Arctic Economic Council to 
obtain first-hand access to input from the Arctic business 
community in the formulation of various Arctic-related 
policies and legislation. The EU should further encourage 
full respect by the private sector of the Arctic Investment 
Protocol, developed by the World Economic Forum but 
transferred to the Arctic Economic Council in 2018. 
Conclusion
The Arctic is no longer a cold and remote periphery. 
Climate change acceleration means it has become a 
geopolitical hot topic that will only gain in prominence in 
the coming years and decades. The EU must have its 
own strategy and narrative for the future of the 
Arctic that combines climate resilience, environmental 
protection, sustainable development, and peaceful 
cooperation to contribute to the security and stability 
of the region. The different EU policies concerning 
the Arctic must be brought together under a real 
overarching strategy.
The overall aim of the EU’s action in Arctic international 
relations should be to engage all interested parties, 
on the basis of multilateral and rules-based diplomacy, 
in order to avoid a fragmentation of Arctic cooperation. 
A safe, stable, sustainable and prosperous Arctic is 
important not just for the European Union but for the 
whole world.
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